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DDAS Accident Report
Accident details
Report date: 14/04/2008

Accident number: 568

Accident time: 11:04

Accident Date: 21/06/2007

Where it occurred: Al Maalieh, Area 7-008
Primary cause: Unavoidable (?)

Country: Lebanon
Secondary cause: Field control
inadequacy (?)

Class: Excavation accident

Date of main report: 08/07/2007

ID original source: 005/2007

Name of source: UNMAS

Organisation: [Name removed]
Mine/device: DPICM M77
submunition

Ground condition: agricultural (recent)
hard
rocks/stones
Date last modified: 14/04/2008

Date record created:
No of victims: 1

No of documents: 2

Map details
Longitude:

Latitude:

Alt. coord. system: UTM 728309/3676516 Coordinates fixed by:
Map east:

Map north:

Map scale:

Map series:

Map edition:

Map sheet:

Map name:

Accident Notes
visor not worn or worn raised (?)

Accident report
The report of this accident was made available in February 2008 as a collection of files and
pictures. Its conversion to a DDAS file means that some of the original formatting has been
lost. The substance of the report is reproduced below, edited for anonymity. The original files
are held on record. Text in [ ] is editorial.
REPORT FOR ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION BOARD OF INQUIRY – No 005/2007
BAC Accident that occurred in Area 7- 008 (CBU 071), UTM 728309/3676516 on the 21st
June 2007 in which a searcher was injured.
References:
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Lebanon National Technical Standards and Guidelines (TSGs)
International Mine Action Standards (IMAS)
[Demining group] Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs)
Map: UNIFIL JENIMAP
MACC SL Mine / UXO information
Introduction
1. In accordance with the National Technical Standards and Guidelines (TSGs), the MACC
SL Programme Manager, Mr. [Name removed] and Lt. Col [Name removed], LMAC
Representative, issued a Verbal Convening Order on Thursday 21st June 07, for an accident
investigation Board of Inquiry (BOI). The MACC SL board members are Capt. [Name
removed], LMAC Operations Officer and [Name removed], Chief of QA MACC SL.
2. This is a comprehensive report by the Board of Inquiry into the Accident that occurred on
21st June 07 which is based on the MACC SL investigation, the [Demining group] internal
investigation report, statements from [Demining group] personnel involved in the accident,
visit to and photographs from the accident site, the accident is considered not preventable.
3. The [Demining group] investigation report was forwarded to the BOI on 27th June 07 and is
attached at Annex A. The accident occurred at approx.1102hrs on the 21st June 2007 in Area
7-008 CBU 071 situated near the village of Al Maalieh, UTM 728309/3676516, additional
information is:
Date: 21st June 2007
Time of Incident: 1104hrs approx.
Location: Al Maalieh, Area 7-008, Lebanon
Task: CBU- 071, Task Dossier 7-008
UTM of location of the munition: UTM: 728309/3676516
Task Start / Finish Date: 20 February 2007, to task not yet completed
Reported by: Mr. [Name removed], A/Programme Manager
Reported to: Operations Department, MACC SL
Time of Incident report to MACC QA: 1110hrs approx.
MA Organisation POC: Mr. [Name removed], A/Programme Manager
Investigation Date/Time: 21st June 07, 1200hrs
Investigation Location: Task CBU - 070
Investigation Team: [Name removed], LMAC Operations Officer and [Name removed], MACC
SL C of QA.
Explosive Ordnance Type: M 42/77 sub-munition (most likely)
Background
4. CBU 071 is part of Task Dossier 7-008 which is a cluster strike area from the recent
conflict. The area is a mixture of citrus plantations. The area is contaminated with Israeli fired
M42/77 sub-munitions.
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5. [Demining group] commenced clearance at this site, CBU 071, on 4th May 2007. Up to the
time of the accident [Demining group] BAC Team had been operational in CBU 070 and
located 31 x M42/77’s, with a total of 48,876m2, a combination surface and sub-surface
searched.
6. The area where the accident occurred was in an orange plantation, portions of the area
had been sub-surface cleared this and previous operations days. Prior to clearance the owner
had visited the plantation to prune the citrus trees (this was evident on all trees in the area of
the accident) and to mound earth around the base of the trees to retain water during irrigation.
Events leading up to the Accident
7. On the morning of 21st June 07 at approximately 0616hrs [Demining group] BAC Teams
commenced operations at CBU 071. At approximately 1104hrs, an uncontrolled explosion
occurred in the plantation at UTM 728309/3676516. An [Demining group] searcher, Mr. [the
Victim] who was conducting search operations in the area of the detonation was not directly
involved in causing the detonation but he was in the immediate area of the detonation where
he was conducting sub surface clearance operations.
Events following the Accident
8. On hearing the detonation, [Demining group] searcher Mr. [Name removed] moved to the
site, as he was the closest to the accident area, he was quickly followed by [Demining group]
team leader Mr. [Name removed] and a number of other searchers. They assessed the
situation confirming that Mr. [Name removed] was lying in a previously sub-surface cleared
area and therefore moved forward to provide medical support prior to the [Demining group]
medical team arriving at the site. The [Demining group] medical team Mr. [Name removed]
and Mr. [Name removed] arrived at the site at approx. 1104hrs and carried out emergency
medical treatment to Mr. [the Victim]. Treatment occurred at the site over the period of 11041119hrs and then he was transported to Jabal Amel hospital in Tyre, arriving at
approx.1131hrs.
BOI Post Accident Activities and General Observations
9. On arrival at the accident scene and after an initial reconnaissance by the Investigation
Officers, it was ascertained that the BOI could gain safe access up to the accident site without
additional clearance being conducted.
10. On inspection of the accident scene on the 21st June 2007 the following general
observations were established:
•

There had been an uncontrolled detonation of an M42 Sub-munitions,

•

The M42 was either partially or completely buried,

•

The area of the detonation was at least 1m forward of the base stick, in an uncleared
area.
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•

[The crater is top right, the red cone is the marking system in use.]
Marking was in accordance with [Demining group] SoPs.

•

Items of equipment, PPE, Visor and detector were located in various locations from
12m away from the working site.

•

No damage had occurred to the PPE, visor, detector, and hand tools.

•

[The undamaged visor approximately 9 metres away.]
Some fragmentation damage was observed to the marking equipment in the
immediate area, used for marking cleared/uncleared area and the citrus trees in the
immediate area.

•

First aid treatment had occurred approx, 12m from the location of the uncontrolled
detonation. The searchers trousers and footwear were at the area of the emergency
treatment

•

No drag ribbon related to the M77/42 deployment was located during the investigation
site visits.

•

The orange trees and the trees in the immediate area had been pruned extensively.
During this process any items, sub-munitions, located in the branches would likely be
dislodged and fall to the ground.

Sequence, Documentation and Procedure of Tasking
11. Task Dossier Area 7-008 was issued to [Demining group] in May 2007. The TD contains
details of 4 x CBU strikes, CBU 071 is one of these. Up to the time of the accident a total area
of 48,876 m² (surface and sub-surface) of the area had been cleared, resulting in the disposal
of a total number of 31 x Sub-Munitions.
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Geography and Weather
12. CBU 071 is located in an agriculture and citrus area. The ground where the detonation
occurred was soft due to the land owner bunding or mounding the earth around the base of
the trees to retain water. All other area was firm.
Site Layout and Marking
13. The site layout, minefield marking was in accordance with National TSGs and [Demining
group] SOPs.
Management, Supervision and Discipline
14. There are no reports of disciplinary action being taken against any [Demining group]
personnel on CBU 070 to date.
Quality Assurance
15. External QA was carried out by the MACC SL QA Section; the last External QA
Evaluation on [Demining group] BAC Team 2 was conducted on 21ST June 2007, Battle
Area Clearance, (Form E), carried out by QA Officer [Name removed]; all evaluation results
were acceptable.
Communications and Reporting
16. Communications between CBU 071 and [Demining group] base location are maintained
VHF and via the use of cell phone. On site communications between teams are also
maintained via VHF handheld radios.
17. On the day of the accident, the site had proper and appropriate communications and
managed to pass all relevant accident information back to [Demining group] base location,
which in turn passed the information to the MACC SL in a timely manner.
Medical Details
18. [The Victim] suffered no injuries, with the exception that he was knocked unconscious but
recovered once medical treatment was commenced at the accident site. After the [Demining
group] medics administered medical treatment and [The Victim] was stabilised on-site he was
evacuated by road to Jabal Amel Hospital in Tyre.
Details of Sub-Munitions Involved
19. The M42/77 HE cluster bomb is commonly referred to among the Lebanese and
Palestinian population as the “battery bomb” or “lighter” bomb because of its shape. There
M42/77 HE grenades are dispensed from various sizes of projectiles, which are initiated my
mechanical times fuses above the target areas to allow dispersion of the grenade. The
M42/77 has a white nylon ribbon which when pulled or touched can detonate. Shortly after
ejection from the projectile, artillery shell or various size of container or dispenser, the M42/77
HE grenade arms due to the rotation of the white nylon ribbon. This ribbon also acts as
stabilizing tail to orient the cone of the grenade towards the target. Upon impact a charge in
the grenade launched downward to penetrate armour while the metal grenade body bursts
into shrapnel-like fragments to wound and kill personnel.
Conclusions
20. Based on the investigation, the statements and visits to the site, the BOI concludes the
following:
a) An M42 or M77 detonated in an un-cleared area approx. 1m in front of where detector
assisted surface clearance was being conducted.
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b) An uncontrolled detonation occurred in an area where the earth had been gathered to
provide a bund around citrus trees to retain water for irrigation.

[There was no earth in photographs, but stones – and no obvious “bund”. This picture shows
a pen at the seat of detonation.]
c) The searcher had not searched or cleared forward of the base stick.
d) When the detonation occurred the searcher was approx. 10m away from the area.
e) It is likely that the searcher had removed his visor on the way to the bathroom, but
was still was wearing his PPE.
f)

Medical treatment was conducted on site in accordance with [Demining group] SOPs.

g) The team leader had not visited the searcher for at least one hour during operations.
h) The area where the accident occurred had been marked with pickets and was in
accordance with [Demining group] SOPs.
Recommendations
21. The following are recommendations based on the BOI conclusions:
•

Revise supervisors/team leaders on the requirements in regards to searcher
supervision and the time/period required.

•

Revise all [Demining group] personnel with regards to the requirement to wear PPE
and visors.

•

During clearance special attention is required in areas that have been disturbed prior
to clearance i.e. earth bunds to the base of trees.

•

Establish known ground level to allow 20cm clearance to occur in area where earth
bunding has occurred.

Signed: C/QA Officer

, MACC SL; LAF Operations Officer

8th July 2007

Internal Demining Group report
Subject: Incident on CBU-71, IMSMA-ID: 2265
Our Date: Thursday, June 21, 2007 (Compiled: 2007-06-26)
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, LMAC/MACC SL

Introduction:
On 21 of June 2007 at approx 11:02 hours an explosion incident occurred at a [Demining
group] clearance site, recognized as CBU-71 with IMSMA-ID: 2265.
Search methodology:
At CBU-71 site, [Demining group] conducting surface search with instrument assistance.
The area is searched with one lane/searcher using Ceia or Schonstedt metal detector and red
cones/sticks as markings, detailed in [Demining group] SOP.
The area:
The search area is in a maintained orange orchard with small stony ground and more or less
no under vegetation. The surrounding trees are without any fruits, indicating that harvest has
been carried out. The density of branches on the trees is low to medium with relativity good
view for visual search of eventual hanging clusters.
Events leading up to the incident:
The searcher was working in the lane when he had a need for toilet. The searcher closed his
lane using a base stick. The searcher put down his detector on the ground. When the
searcher was approximate 10 meters away the detonation occurred. The searcher fell down,
turned on the side and become unconscious.
According to what the searcher said 2007-06-22:
•

The searcher did not see any cluster in the tree or on the ground.

•

The searcher did not see any signs of clusters.

•

The searcher used his detector but had no signal/reading before closing the lane.

•

The searcher did not hear or see any other person in the vicinity.

•

The distance to closest colleague was approximate 40 meter.

•

The first person he remembered/ recognized after the unconscious stage was the
medic.

Immediate action taken following the incident:
The Team Leader was checking other searchers when the detonation occurred. After the
detonation the team leader checked his searchers and tried to find out where the detonation
was taken place. After approx 1 ½ minute the Team leader identified the lane and found
almost simultaneously with two other nearby working searchers the searcher unconscious.
The unconscious searcher was found in searched terrain, on same location as the vest. The
Team leader together with assisting searchers recognized the unconscious stage but
breathing of fallen searcher, and they called for medic assistance. When medic arrived, the
Team leader with assisting searchers arranged guidance for medic to site of incident and
medical treatment was initiated.
Medical treatment and Medevac procedure:
DESCRIPTION OF THE INCIDENT [reproduced under Medical report]
Post incident scene investigation:
Initial scene investigation was conducted 2007-06-21. Done by Act. Operation Manager and a
national EOD 2 member of [Demining group], together with MACC SL and NDO
representatives.
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Additional investigation of detonation pit was conducted 2007-06-22, done by a [Demining
group] SV together with Chief of MACC SL QA Department.

Picture 1.
The border of searched/not searched areas was well marked. The location of detonation was
1 meter in front of ongoing search, in not searched area. One cone was lying flipped over and
was most likely moved by air pressure. One cone is penetrated of several fragmentations.
[Other pictures removed]
The detector was laying in good order on 7 meters distance from RP, indicating that the
searcher has intentionally put the detector down on the ground.
The visor was laying in good order on 9 meters distance from RP, indicating that the searcher
or other person has intentionally put the visor down on the ground without to prevent getting
scratch marks.
The protective vest, shoes and trousers was taken off the searcher by medics due to medical
body check.
Probable cause of the incident:
There could be several reasons of why the cluster went to detonation, together or
independently; strong sun, animal, falling down from the tree. A specific reason can not be
identified at this stage.
Conclusion:
If the searcher was searching during detonation, he should have wounds of fragmentation in
his legs, since his position should normally be between the cone with fragmentation marks
and actual location of detonation.
The searcher confirmed that he was not conducting clearance in his search lane; he was
taking a short break to go for toilet when the detonation occurred.
The cluster was most likely not hanging in the tree; therefore the initiation of CB was not
caused by falling down into detonation. The cluster went off into detonation by unknown
cause and was most likely not affected by searcher in any means.
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The markings was in good order and search procedures by the searcher was most likely
following the [Demining group] SOP and was not the reason causing the uncontrolled
detonation.
There is a contradiction concerning Visor on or off on the searcher during the incident.
According to what the assisting staff was saying, they did not take the visor off, but the
searcher himself says that he was wearing full PPE. The involved assisting staff did not
recognize during the verbal hearing the same day that they had touched or moved the visor
on the scene.
The Visor position could indicate that the searcher has taken the visor off inside the hazard
area during work time. If so, this is a major safety violation and not follows the [Demining
group] SOP.
Intended follow-up actions and recommendations:
Follow up actions:
•

[Demining group] had initial briefing with the teams the same day, informing them
about medical status then next morning an additional brief/update was given. Some
individuals on BAC teams needed extra time to talk through the incident and an
organized debrief was carried out by Supervisor.

•

An After-Action review will be carried out, with the intentions of finding out individuals
action towards SOP and organization set up in general.

•

A Dictaphone is implemented at [Demining group] OPS/Radio room, helping to
memorize communications in future

•

Casevac drills.

Recommendations:
•

The Team leader has to visit the searchers more frequently due to different needs,
improve markings etc. of working searcher.

•

The SVs and Team leaders has to maintain the focus of searching staff on potential
clusters still hanging in trees, even if this incident most likely was not a case as such.

•

The SVs and Team leaders has to make sure that searchers follows and understand
given instructions concerning [Demining group] SOP.

Victim Report
Victim number: 742

Name: [Name removed]

Age: 20

Gender: Male

Status: deminer

Fit for work: presumed

Compensation: Not made available

Time to hospital: 27 minutes

Protection issued: Frontal apron

Protection used: Frontal apron

Long visor

Summary of injuries:
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minor Arm
minor Back
minor Leg
COMMENT
Victim was initially unconscious and reported a back injury. See Medical report.

Medical report
An IMSMA report confirmed that the victim was male, and born in 1987.The form had been
overwritten with “contusion”. A back injury was reported along with pain in the arm, back and
thigh. The time taken for the victim to reach hospital was recorded as 10 minutes.
CASUALTY REPORT BY (MEDIC)
DESCRIPTION OF THE INCIDENT
Incident date: 21/6/2007
Location: Al Maalieh
Type of Incident: Casualty and Shock due to cluster explosion
Time of Incident: 11:02
Patient’s condition: Unconscious
Support medic: [Names removed]
Patient’s history
Allergy to drugs: No
Diabetic: No
Cardiac: No
Hypertensive: No
Others: No
Communication procedures:
Radio report:
Internal team radio communication: Adequate
External communication with [Demining group] base and the [Demining group] operations
officer: Adequate
The person who contact the hospital: medical coordinator ([Name removed])
Time of [Demining group] operations officer arrival the scene: 12:00
Time of ambulance arrival the scene: 11:04 am
Medical treatment on the site:
Type of treatment: oral airway, Oxygen administration 15 l/min, Intra venous infusion Lactated
Ringer 1 liter.
Time from incident to initial first first aid: 11:02-11:04 am
Time spent at site administering treatment: 11:04-11:19 am
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Time from Casevac at site to arrival at hospital (Jabal Amel): 11:19-11:31 am
Discussions:
The medic and his assistant informed by the team leader about the incident, the medic moved
directly from the medical site to the casualty site after assuring about the safety and can enter
the area.
First, the casualty was unconscious due to shock. He was wearing PPE, removed by the
medic and initial and rapid assessment started:
Level of conscious: Unresponsive
Airway: clear and opened
Breathing: Normal
Circulation: Normal pulse with no external bleeding or any signs or symptoms of internal
bleeding.
Collar neck placed for him.
Rapid assessment of head, neck, abdomen, chest, extremities showed normal and intact no
external injuries.
Oral airway placed for him because of unconsciousness, then directly the gag reflex of the
casualty returned back and started to be conscious with stress state and cramps with
presence of shoulder, thigh and back pain. Oxygen by Ambu bag given for him and intra
venous infusion administered, then transported to the ambulance by using spinal board to the
nearest hospital (Jabal Amel) for examinations.
On route:
Reassessment showed that the casualty is in stable state with normal vital signs and oxygen
given for him till arriving the hospital.
The casualty arrived the hospital to the emergency department after 10 min. of evacuation for
examination and treatment.

Statements
REPORT BY (SEARCHER)
I was the nearest person to the casualty [Name removed], when I heard the bomb sound I
went directly to the site to help him, there were many fragmentation around, I wait for a
moment then I entered for helping, I was ambitious and ready for help him, so I did the first
aid procedures. He was unconscious but he was breathing with presence of pulse, at this time
the team leader arrived to the site for investigation and assisting me till the medic arrived.
This incident is a good experience for me, it helped me to be stronger of how to deal with
these situations.

REPORT BY TEAM LEADER
While I was making QA on the girls I heard a sound of a cluster I run down where the other
section were working they told me that we has a detonation where [the Victim] was working I
enter the field I saw [he] was lying on the ground and I left all the equipment in its place and in
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my opinion that [the Victim] was working and the cluster go and he have a shock and he runs
he lied on the ground and the equipment fall from his hands.

REPORT BY SEARCHER 2
When the accident occurred I shouted in a loud voice but no body heard me so I ran toward
the casualty and I saw him lying down on unconscious state.

REPORT BY SEARCHER 3
When I entered the incident site I noticed many things: first the casualty was lying down 12 m
far away from the site of accident and the detector was far away from the accident site and
the helmet was off because the casualty has eye injury as the medic said this means that the
casualty was not wearing PPE and the detector was placed by hand not threw on the ground
due to explosion and not destroyed, this lead to a conclusion that the casualty was in a
resting period may for eat or drink and he was far away from the cluster for that reason he
has no injury.
Finally, I think that the cluster did not fall down from the tree because there was no winds but
may be one searcher who was working closer to him threw it (this is my opinion).

REPORT BY (the casualty)
While I was working in my lane, I stopped when I passed the half of it and closed my lane in a
base stick because I want to go to bathroom, I placed may detonator in a safe place and I
walked about 2 to 3 meters when the cluster exploded, it was in unsafe area. I fell down 9 to
10 meters far away from the cluster and I was in unconscious state.
Note: I was wearing PPE and Helmet during the accident.

REPORT BY SUPERVISOR
Date: 21/06/2007
Time: 11:02 am
Location: CBU 71 (Maalieh)
I was in Rest Area working as a SV when I heard DTL [Name removed] calling for medic and
then I noticed that a cluster go off and one searcher [the Victim] is injured. Then the medic
arrived to the scene and took [the Victim] to Jabal Amel hospital.
During the accident me and [Name removed] (TL) we noticed that [the Victim] was only
unconscious and wasn’t talking. In my opinion I think that the searcher was taking a break
and he wasn’t wearing the visor.

Analysis
The primary cause of this accident is listed as “Unavoidable” because it seems that the
munition was initiated while no one was nearby. The cause was not determined but the
statements of those involved mention possible causes that appear not to have been
investigated, and include mention of an unreported eye injury.
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The Victim was knocked unconscious so must have been struck by something, possibly a
rock, in the back (his only obvious injury). He was too far away to have been affected by the
small blast. The position of his equipment indicates that he was not wearing his visor at the
time. He was on his way to “the bathroom” which was not a designated area, and he had not
been visited by his supervisor for an hour. The absence of a designated latrine area and the
absence of field supervision are both “Field control inadequacies”, and so this is recorded as
the secondary cause.
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